

Global Reallocations in the US-China Trade War

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Motivation

- In 2018-19, US-China engaged in a trade war, taxing \$450b of annual trade
 - ▶ thousands of goods tariffed, avg US tariffs from about 4% to 25%
 - ▶ US and China tariffs targeted 3.6% of US GDP and 5.5% of China GDP
- This paper: How are **bystanders'** exports affected?

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- This paper: How are **bystanders'** exports affected?
- Trade war is a natural experiment to understand the key forces driving world trade
 - ▶ Substitution/complementarities?
 - ▶ Scale?
 - ▶ Specialization?

This Paper

- ① Framework to guide empirical analysis that captures these elements
- ② Estimate impacts of tariffs on bystanders' exports to US, CH, rest of world (RW)
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Method:

- model motivates product-level regressions to estimate impact of trade-war tariffs on countries' exports
- ...allowing for country-, sector-, and size-specific tariff responses

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- ① Bystanders increased exports to US, no change to CH, increased to RW
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 - ▶ countries classified as complements or substitutes of US/China, and operating along upward or downward supply

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 - ★ COL, UKR: not beneficiaries bc they complement US and China

Related Literature

- Interdependency across export destinations
 - ▶ Morales et al 19, Alfaro et al 23, Alumnia et al 18, Mau 17, Flaaen et al 20, Albornoz et al 21
- Cross-country variation in trade elasticities
 - ▶ Anderson VW 03, Eaton Kortum 02, Costinot et al 12, Caliendo Parro 15, Adao et al 17, Lind Ramondo 18
- Scale economies
 - ▶ Antweiler Trefler 02, Costinot et al 19, Bartelme et al 19, Lashkaripir Lugovskyy 22
- US-China Trade War
 - ▶ Amiti et al. 19, Fajgelbaum et al. 20, Cavallo et al. 21, Flaaen et al. 20, Flaaen Pierce 19, Waugh 19

Framework

- Ricardian-Armington trade model
- Translog aggregator of varieties (origins) of product ω from sector j in country n :

$$s_{i\omega}^n = a_{i\omega}^n + \sum_{i' \in \mathcal{I}} \sigma_{i'i}^j \ln p_{i'\omega}^n$$

- ▶ with prices $p_{i'\omega}^n = \tau_{i'\omega}^n T_{i\omega}^n p_{i'\omega}$
- ▶ $\sigma_{iCH}^j, \sigma_{iUS}^j$ capture i 's substitution with CH and US
- ▶ assume $\sigma_{ii'}^j = \sigma_{RW}^j$ for $i' \neq i$ and $i \neq US, CH$

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 - ▶ assume $\sigma_{ii'}^j = \sigma_{RW}^j$ for $i' \neq i$ and $i \neq US, CH$
- Supply (sales) curve of exporter i of product ω :

$$X_{i\omega} \equiv A_{ij} p_{i\omega}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon_i^j}} Z_{i\omega}$$

- ▶ A_{ij} : endogenous sector (j)-level cost shifters (ie, wages, input costs)
 - ▶ $Z_{i\omega}$ exogenous cost shifter
 - ▶ $\epsilon_i^j = \frac{1}{\epsilon_i} - \gamma_i^j$, where ϵ_i^j reflects factor mobility & γ_i^j reflects scale
- Equilibrium: prices $\{p_{i\omega}\}$ such that goods markets clear

Impact of US-China Tariffs on Third-Country Exports

Proposition

Given tariff shocks $\{T_{i\omega}^n\}$, first-order approximation around an arbitrary initial equilibrium:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \ln X_{i\omega}^n = & \beta_{1i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{CH,\omega}^{US} + \beta_{2i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{US,\omega}^{CH} + \beta_{3i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{i,\omega}^{US} + \beta_{4i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{i,\omega}^{CH} \\ & + \beta_{5i\omega}^n \sum_{j \neq CH, US, i} \Delta \ln T_{j,\omega}^{US} + \beta_{6i\omega}^n \sum_{j \neq CH, US, i} \Delta \ln T_{j,\omega}^{CH} + \eta_{i\omega}^n\end{aligned}$$

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- $\beta_{1i\omega}^n$: tariff response to US tariff on China:

$$\beta_{1i\omega}^n \equiv \left(1_{n=US} + \frac{E_{\omega}^{US}}{E_{\omega}} \frac{1}{\frac{X_{i\omega}/E_{\omega}}{b_i^j \sigma_{ii}^j} - 1} \right) \frac{\sigma_{CHi}^j}{s_{i\omega}^n}$$

- ▶ substitutability: σ_{CHi}^j
- ▶ scale: $b_i^j \sigma_{ii}^j$
- ▶ size: $\frac{E_{\omega}^n}{E_{\omega}}$, $\frac{X_{i\omega}}{E_{\omega}}$, $\frac{X_{i\omega}^n}{E_{\omega}^n}$

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- $\eta_{i\omega}^n$: other goods prices, factor prices, aggregate demand shifts

$$\eta_{i\omega}^n = \frac{\left(\sum_{n' \in \mathcal{I}} \frac{X_{i\omega}^{n'}}{X_{i\omega}} \hat{E}_\omega^{n'} - \hat{A}_{ij} \right) b_i^j \sigma_{ii}^j + \sum_{i' = US, CH} \sigma_{CHi}^j \hat{p}_{i'\omega} + \sigma_{RW}^j \sum_{i' \neq i} \hat{p}_{i'\omega}}{1 - \frac{\sigma_{ii}^j b_i^j}{X_{i\omega} / E_\omega}} \frac{1}{s_{i\omega}^n} + \hat{E}_\omega^n$$

- ▶ vanishes with
 - ★ Cobb-Douglas product-level shifters
 - ★ $\rightarrow 0$ price changes in US and China
 - ★ $\rightarrow 0$ cross-substitutions ($\sigma_{RW}^j = 0$)
- ▶ implementation: exporter-importer-sector FEs, size controls, assess pre-trends

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- Set $\beta_5 = \beta_6 = 0$ because of lack of tariff variation

Parameter Regions Implied by Export Responses

Proposition

When the US imposes a tariff on China in product ω , then:

(i) if $\sigma_{CHi} > 0$ ($\sigma_{CHi} < 0$), exports from i to the US generally increase (decrease)

(ii) if $\sigma_{CHi} > 0$ ($\sigma_{CHi} < 0$) and $\sigma_{ii} < 0$, exports increase (decrease) from i to RW iff

$$\frac{X_{i\omega}/E_{\omega}}{\sigma_{ii}} < b_i < 0.$$

	Exports:	
	Decrease to US ($\beta_{1i\omega}^{US} < 0$)	Increase to US ($\beta_{1i\omega}^{US} > 0$)
Increase to RW ($\beta_{1i\omega}^{RW} > 0$)		
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- Same logic applies to Chinese tariffs on US
 - ▶ In that case, sign of σ_{USi} is revealed

Data

- Global bilateral trade data, 2014:1–2019:12 Comtrade
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 - ▶ US, CH, RW as destinations

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- Statutory tariff schedules, 2018:1–2019:12
 - ▶ $\Delta T_{CH,\omega}^{US}$: US tariff changes on China in product ω US ITC
 - ▶ $\Delta T_{i,\omega}^{US}$: US tariffs changes on exporter i US ITC
 - ▶ $\Delta T_{US,\omega}^{CH}$: China tariffs changes on US China MoF
 - ▶ $\Delta T_{i,\omega}^{CH}$: China MFN tariffs (ex USA) Bown et al. 2019

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- Definitions
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 - ▶ ω : products (hs6)
 - ▶ j : 9 sectors
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- Aggregate data to 24-month periods, study long differences
 - ▶ Examine 2016/17 to 2018/19 export growth in response to tariffs
 - ▶ Scale tariffs in proportion to their duration through the 24-month interval

Summary Statistics: World Trade in 2017


Industry	Examples	USD	Share	# HS6	Share
Machinery	Engines, computers, cell phones	5,632	0.30	771	0.15
Materials	Plastics, lumber, stones, glass	2,246	0.12	639	0.12
Transport	Vehicles, airplanes, parts	2,121	0.11	130	0.02
Chemicals	Medications, cosmetics, vaccines	1,884	0.10	787	0.15
Agriculture	Soy beans, wine, coffee, beef	1,617	0.09	899	0.17
Minerals	Oil, coal, salt, electricity	1,586	0.08	148	0.03
Metals	Copper, steel, iron, aluminum	1,350	0.07	563	0.11
Apparel	Footwear, t-shirts, hand bags	1,100	0.06	912	0.18
Miscellaneous	Medical devices, furniture, art	1,255	0.07	354	0.07

- 5203 HS6 products classified into 9 sectors

▶ specialization


US Tariff Changes

ΔT_{CH}^{US} & ΔT_i^{US}



China Tariff Changes

ΔT_{US}^{CH} & ΔT_i^{CH}




China Exports to US on ΔT_{CH}^{US}

China's exports to US fall with US tariff

$$\Delta X_{CH\omega}^{US} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{CH\omega}^{US} + \epsilon_{CH\omega}^{US}$$

Panel A
China's Export Value to US



Pre-period: $\beta = -0.12$ (0.29).


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Panel A
China's Export Value to US

○ 2015-17 ● 2017-19



Pre-period: $\beta = -0.12$ (0.29). Post-period: $\beta = -1.34$ (0.27).


US Exports to China on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

US exports to CH fall with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{US\omega}^{CH} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{US\omega}^{CH}$$

Panel B
US Export Value to China

◦ 2015-17



Pre-period: $\beta=1.87$ (0.46).


US Exports to China on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

US exports to CH fall with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{US\omega}^{CH} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{US\omega}^{CH}$$

Panel B
US Export Value to China

○ 2015-17 ● 2017-19




Pre-period: $\beta=1.87$ (0.46). Post-period: $\beta=-2.98$ (0.42).

RW Exports to US on ΔT_{CH}^{US}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to US increase with US tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{US} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{CH\omega}^{US} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{US}$$

Panel A
Bystanders' Export Value to US




Pre-period: $\beta = -0.19$ (0.10).

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Takeaway 1: RW exports to US increase with US tariff

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Panel A
Bystanders' Export Value to US




Pre-period: $\beta = -0.19$ (0.10). Post-period: $\beta = 0.31$ (0.10).

RW Exports to CH on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to CH flat with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{CH} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{CH}$$

Panel B
Bystanders' Export Value to China




Pre-period: $\beta=0.07$ (0.18).

RW Exports to CH on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to CH flat with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{CH} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{CH}$$

Panel B
Bystanders' Export Value to China




Pre-period: $\beta=0.07$ (0.18). Post-period: $\beta=0.01$ (0.19).

RW Exports to RW on ΔT_{CH}^{US}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to RW increase with US tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{RW} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{CH\omega}^{US} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{RW}$$

Panel C
Bystanders' Export Value to RW




Pre-period: $\beta = -0.14$ (0.08).

RW Exports to RW on ΔT_{CH}^{US}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to RW increase with US tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{RW} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{CH\omega}^{US} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{RW}$$

Panel C
Bystanders' Export Value to RW




Pre-period: $\beta = -0.14$ (0.08). Post-period: $\beta = 0.20$ (0.08).

RW Exports to RW on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to RW increase with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{RW} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{RW}$$

Panel D
Bystanders' Export Value to RW




Pre-period: $\beta=0.11$ (0.08).

RW Exports to RW on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to RW increase with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{RW} = \alpha + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{RW}$$

Panel D
Bystanders' Export Value to RW



Pre-period: $\beta=0.11$ (0.08). Post-period: $\beta=0.29$ (0.08).

Main Specification

- Full specification:

$$\Delta \ln X_{i\omega}^n = \beta_{1i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{CH,\omega}^{US} + \beta_{2i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{US,\omega}^{CH} + \beta_{3i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{i,\omega}^{US} + \beta_{4i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{i,\omega}^{CH} \\ + \alpha_{ij}^n + \Omega^n SIZE_{i\omega} + \pi^n \Delta \ln X_{i\omega,t-1}^n + \epsilon_{i\omega}^n,$$

- ▶ $\beta_{zi\omega}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n SIZE_{zi\omega} \quad z = 1, 2, 3, 4$
- ▶ run separately to destinations $n = US, CH, RW$
- ▶ country-sector fixed effects, lagged growth controls for pretrends

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- ▶ $\beta_{zi\omega}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n SIZE_{zi\omega} \quad z = 1, 2, 3, 4$
- ▶ run separately to destinations $n = US, CH, RW$
- ▶ country-sector fixed effects, lagged growth controls for pretrends
- ▶ $SIZE_{zi\omega}$ contains three proxies:
 - ★ share US (or CH) imports in global imports in ω
 - ★ share of exporter i exports in global imports in ω
 - ★ share of variety $i\omega$ in destination n imports

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- ▶ $\beta_{zi\omega}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n SIZE_{zi\omega}$ $z = 1, 2, 3, 4$
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 - ★ share of exporter i exports in global imports in ω
 - ★ share of variety $i\omega$ in destination n imports


- Predicted values:

$$\Delta \ln \widehat{X}_i^{WD} = \sum_{\omega} \sum_n \lambda_{i\omega}^n \left(\widehat{\beta}_{1i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{CH,\omega}^{US} + \widehat{\beta}_{2i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{US,\omega}^{CH} + \widehat{\beta}_{3i\omega}^n \ln T_{i,\omega}^{US} + \widehat{\beta}_{4i\omega}^n \Delta \ln T_{i,\omega}^{CH} \right)$$

- ▶ $\lambda_{i\omega}^n$ pre-war export shares of variety $i\omega$ in total exports of i to n

Relative Export Growth in Targeted Products

Takeaway 2: Large Heterogeneity in Predicted Exporter Growth




90/10 bootstrapped error bars

▶ correlates


Decomposing Relative Exports, $\beta_{ziw}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n SIZE_{ziw}$

Takeaway 3: Importance of Country Component




Decomposing Relative Exports, $\beta_{ziw}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n \text{SIZE}_{ziw}$

Takeaway 3: Importance of Country Component




Decomposing Relative Exports, $\beta_{ziw}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n \text{SIZE}_{ziw}$

Takeaway 3: Importance of Country Component




Decomposing Relative Exports, $\beta_{ziw}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n SIZE_{ziw}$

Takeaway 3: Importance of Country Component




Decomposing Relative Exports, $\beta_{ziw}^n = \beta_{zi}^n + \beta_{zj(\omega)}^n + \Gamma_z^n SIZE_{ziw}$

Takeaway 3: Importance of Country Component



Supply and Demand Forces

Takeaway 4: Supply and Demand Forces Driving Response





Conclusion

- US-China trade war was seen as a major turning point in the globalization era
 - ▶ our results do not support this view, at least for the time horizon we analyze
 - ▶ several countries increased global exports in products with higher US-China tariffs, relative to non-taxed products
- Future work to uncover the factors driving the country-component of tariff elasticities

Countries' Pre-War Export Baskets

Agriculture Apparel Chemicals Machinery Materials Metals Minerals Misc Transport



Robustness: RW to RW

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\Delta T_{CH,\omega}^{US} (\beta_1)$	0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	0.29** (0.11)	0.11 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
$\Delta T_{US,\omega}^{CH} (\beta_2)$	0.35*** (0.08)	0.32*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.09)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.08)	0.34*** (0.08)
$\Delta T_{i,\omega}^{US} (\beta_3)$	0.09 (0.20)	0.09 (0.18)	0.26 (0.20)	-0.19 (0.26)	0.12 (0.20)	0.52*** (0.19)	0.54*** (0.19)
$\Delta T_{i,\omega}^{CH} (\beta_4)$	-0.19 (0.20)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.20)	0.73*** (0.27)	-0.21 (0.20)	0.30 (0.18)	0.26 (0.18)
Pre-trend control	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	cty-ind9	cty-ind9	cty-ind9	cty-hs2	ind9	cty	none
Winsorized	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
R2	.11	.097	.009	.14	.099	.1	.098
N	223,556	223,556	223,556	223,552	223,556	223,556	223,556
Exporters	48	48	48	48	48	48	48

Outcome is the log change in bystander countries' exports to countries other than the US and China. Column 1 is the baseline specification. Column 2 winsorizes the top and bottom 1% of the outcome. Column 3 excludes the pre-trend control. Columns 4-7 show robustness to alternative fixed effects: respectively, country-hs2, industry only, country only, and none.

[▶ return](#)

Framework Details

- In country i , a bundle K_{ij} of inputs is used in tradeable sector j
- Each unit $k \in K_{ij}$ solves:

$$\max_{\omega} \max_x \left(p_{i\omega} z_{i\omega}^0 e_{\omega}^k \right)^{1-\alpha_j^I} x^{\alpha_j^I} - c_{ij}^I x,$$

- ▶ $z_{i\omega}^0 = Z_{i\omega} K_{i\omega}^{\gamma_i}$ captures scale effects
- ▶ e_{ω}^k is distributed Frechet with shape parameter ε_i
- ▶ c_{ij}^I is the cost of intermediates

- Yields $X_{i\omega} \equiv A_{ij} p_{i\omega}^{\frac{1}{b_i}} Z_{i\omega}$ where

$$A_{ij} \equiv \left(\frac{c_{ij}^I}{\alpha_j^I} \right)^{\frac{\alpha_j^I}{\alpha_j^I - 1}} K_{ij}^{\frac{1}{b_i \varepsilon_i}} r_{ij}^{\frac{b_i - 1}{b_i}}$$

where


$$r_{ij}^{\varepsilon_i} = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega^I} \left(p_{i\omega} \left(c_{ij}^I / \alpha_j^I \right)^{\frac{\alpha_j^I}{\alpha_j^I - 1}} z_{i\omega}^0 \right)^{\varepsilon_i}$$

China Exports to US on ΔT_{CH}^{US}

China's exports to US fall with US tariff

$$\Delta X_{CH\omega}^{US} = \alpha_j + \beta \Delta T_{CH\omega}^{US} + \epsilon_{CH\omega}^{US}$$

Panel A
China's Export Value to US



Pre-period: $\beta=0.02$ (0.30). Post-period: $\beta=-1.58$ (0.29).

▶ back


US Exports to China on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

US exports to CH fall with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{US\omega}^{CH} = \alpha_j + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{US\omega}^{CH}$$

Panel B
US Export Value to China

○ 2015-17 ● 2017-19



Pre-period: $\beta=2.26$ (0.48). Post-period: $\beta=-3.18$ (0.44).

▶ back


RW Exports to US on ΔT_{CH}^{US}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to US increase with US tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{US} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta \Delta T_{CH\omega}^{US} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{US}$$

Panel A
Bystanders' Export Value to US

○ 2015-17 ● 2017-19



Pre-period: $\beta = -0.12$ (0.11). Post-period: $\beta = 0.20$ (0.11).

▶ back


RW Exports to CH on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to CH flat with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{CH} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{CH}$$

Panel B
Bystanders' Export Value to China

○ 2015-17 ● 2017-19



Pre-period: $\beta = -0.01$ (0.18). Post-period: $\beta = -0.06$ (0.20).


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RW Exports to RW on ΔT_{CH}^{US}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to RW increase with US tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{RW} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta \Delta T_{CH\omega}^{US} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{RW}$$

Panel C
Bystanders' Export Value to RW



Pre-period: $\beta = -0.00$ (0.09). Post-period: $\beta = 0.15$ (0.09).


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RW Exports to RW on ΔT_{US}^{CH}

Takeaway 1: RW exports to RW increase with CH tariff

$$\Delta X_{RW\omega}^{RW} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta \Delta T_{US\omega}^{CH} + \epsilon_{RW\omega}^{RW}$$


Panel D
Bystanders' Export Value to RW



Pre-period: $\beta=0.12$ (0.08). Post-period: $\beta=0.30$ (0.08).

▶ back

Export Growth Correlates



Supply and Demand Forces

Takeaway 4: Supply and Demand Forces Driving Response

